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Sense and Non-Sense: Jury Trial
Communication
Robert F. Forston*
The Anglo-American jury is a remarkable political institution . . . [which] represents a deep commitment to the use of
laymen in the administration of justice. . . . It opposes the
cadre of professional, experienced judges with this transient,
ever-changing, ever-inexperienced group of amateurs. The jury
is thus by definition an exciting experiment in the conduct of
serious human affairs, and it is not surprising that, virtually
from its inception, it has been the subject of deep controversy,
attracting a t once the most extravagant praise and the most
harsh criticism.'

For centuries jurists and scholars have debated the advantages and disadvantages of the jury system, the competence or
incompetence of jurors as fact-finders and appliers of the law, and
the uniformity or capriciousness of the "justice" that results from
the ~ y s t e mRecently
.~
the number of empirical studies on the jury
system has been growing rapidly. Inquiries have been made into
the competence of juror^,^ the selection and management of ju*Associate Professor of Speech Communication, Chairman of the Department of
Speech Communication, Drake University, Des Moines, Iowa. B.A., 1963, M.A., 1966,
Ph.D., 1968, University of Minnesota. Commissioner, Iowa Supreme Court Commission
on Continuing Legal Education.
1. H. KALVEN
& H. ZEISEL,THE AMERICAN
JURY
3, 4 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
& ZEISEL].
KALVEN
2. Id. at 7-9. The following is a short bibliographical sampling of the controversy:
MIND148 (1935); L.
DEVLIN,
TRIALBYJUDGE
164 (1956); J. FRANK,
LAWAND THE MODERN
GREEN,
JUDGES
AND JURY
(1930); E. LIVINGSTON,
SYSTEMS
OF PENAL
LAWFOR THE STATEOF
LOUISIANA
AND FOR THE UNITED
STATES
OF AMERICA
10 (1873); G. WILLIAMS,
THEPROOFOF
GUILT(3d. ed. 1963); Hearing Before the Subcomm. to Investigate the Adm'n of the
Internal Security Act of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 63
(1955); Benson, Can Our Judicial System Be Improved by the Elimination of Civil Jury
Trials, 15 FED'NINS. COUN.Q. 18 (1965); Brass, Should Jury Trails be Abolished in Civil
Cases? 37 N.Y.S.B.J. 157 (1965); Curtis, The Trial Judge and the Jury, 5 VAND.L. REV.
150 (1952); Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA.L. REV.1055 (1964); Pound, Law
in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM.L. REV.12 (1910); Sunderland, Verdicts, General and
Special, 29 YALEL.J. 253 (1920); Wigmore, A Program on the Trial of a Jury Trial, 12 J.
AM. JUD.SOC'Y166 (1929); Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65
HARV.L. REV.1281 (1952); Comment, Abolition of the Civil Jury: Proposed Alternative,
15 DEPAUL
L. REV.416 (1966).
3. E.g., Dashiel, Experimental Studies of the Influence of Social Situations, in
OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY
1097 (G. Murchinson ed. 1935); KALVEN
& ZEISEL,supra
HANDBOOK
note 1; R. SIMON,
THEJURYAND THE DEFENSE
OF INSANITY
(1967) [hereinafter cited as

602

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1975:

r ~ r sthe
, ~ effects of videotape on juror^,^ how foremen are chosen,'
jury decision-making dynamic^,^ juror bias caused by sex,
SIMON];
Erlanger, Jury Research in America: Its Past and Future, 4 L. & SOC'YREV.345
(1970); Hoffman & Brodley, Jurors on Trial, 17 Mo. L. REV.235 (1952); James, Status
and Competence of Jurors, 64 AM. J . SOC. 563 (1959) [hereinafter cited as James];
Marston, Studies in Testimony, 15 J. CRIM.L.C. & P.S. 1 (1924); Redmont, Psychological
Tests for Selecting Jurors, 5 U. KAN.L. REV.391 (1957); Summers, A Comparative Study
of the Qualifications of State and Federal Jurors, 34 WIS. B. BULL.35 (Oct. 1961); Note,
Psychological Tests and Standards of Competence for Selecting Jurors, 65 YALEL.J. 531
(1956).
4. E.g., Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69 (1970); Edling,
Obtaining Jurors, 1 TEX.L. & LEG.68 (1947); Lasdon, Waren & Madson, Juror Manage402 (1974); Plutchik & Schwartz, Jury
ment in a Metropolitan Court, 57 JUDICATURE
Selection: Folklore or Science?, 1 CRIM.L. BULL.NO. 4 a t 3 (1965); Vanderzell, The Jury
as a Community Cross-Section, 19 W. POL.Q. 136 (1966); Wildman, Selection and ExamiL. REV.32 (1955); Comment, Class Discrimination in Selection
nation of Jurors, 5 DEPAUL
of Jurors, 5 CATH.U.L. REV.157 (1955); Comment, Jury-Pretrial Selection-Suggested
Improvements, 56 MICH.L. REV.954 (1958); Note, The Congress, the Court and Jury
Selection, 52 VA. L. REV.1069 (1966); Note, Fair Jury Selection Procedures, 75 YALEL.J.
322 (1965).
5. E.g., Miller & Siebert, Effects of Video Taped Testimony on Information Processing and Decision-Making Jury Trials, N.S.F. Progress Rep. 1 (March 1974); R. Forston,
Courtroom Access-T.V.: Clarification and Recommendations, Nov. 1972 (paper presented to the Western Speech Comm. Ass'n Conv., Honolulu); G. Miller, D. Bender, T.
Florence & H. Nicholson, Communication Variables in the Judicial Process, Dec. 1972
(paper presented before the Speech Comm. Ass'n Conv.); Miller, Bender, Florence &
Nicholson, Real Versus Reel: What's the Verdict?, 24 J. COMM.
99 (Summer 1974); Miller,
242 (1974); Symposium: The Use
Televised Trials; How Do Juries React?, 58 JUDICATURE
of Videotape in the Courtroom, 1975 B.Y.U.L. REV.327; T. V. Cameras Used in Michigan
Court, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1971, a t 24, col. 1; Use of Videotape Growing in Courtroom,
Chi. Tribune, July 18, 1974, § 4a, a t 3, col. 1.
6. E.g., R. Forston, The Foreman Myth, Apr. 1974 (paper presented to the Central
States Speech Ass'n Conv., Milwaukee); R. Gordon, A Study in Forensic Psychology:
Petit Jury Verdicts as a Function of the Number of Jury Members, 1968 (doctoral dissertation, University of Oklahoma) [hereinafter cited as Gordon]; C. Hawkins, Interaction
and Coalition Realignments in Consensus-Seeking Groups: A Study of Experimental Jury
Deliberation, 1960 (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago) [hereinafter
cited as Hawkins]; Bevan, Aldert, Loiseaux, Mayfield & Wright, Jury Behavior as a
Function of the Prestige of the Foreman and the Nature of His Leadership, 7 J. PUB.L.
419 (1958).
7. T . Baker, A Dimension of Source Credibility Which Affects Jury Decision-Making
in Personal Injury Cases, 1968 (unpublished masters thesis, Northern Illinois University);
R. Fortson, Communication Process: A Method for Improving Judge-Lawyer-Juror Communication, Dec. 1974 (paper presented to the Speech Comm. Ass'n Conv., Chicago); R.
Forston, The Decision-Making Process in the American Civil Jury: A Comparative Methodological Investigation, 1968 (doctoral dissertation, University of Minnesota) [hereinafter
cited as Forston (1968)]; R. Forston, How the Jury Decides, (Continuing Legal Educ.
Center, Drake Univ. 1970); Hawkins, supra note 6; J. Kessler, Techniques of Jury Research, Apr. 1974 (paper presented to Central States Speech Ass'n Conv., Chicago); Luck,
Trial Jury Decision-Making Research: A Synthesis and Critique, 1970 (masters thesis,
University of Georgia) [hereinafter cited as Luck]; Broeder, The Importance of the
L. REV.513
Scapegoat in Jury Trial Cases: Some Preliminary Reflections, 4 DUQUESNE
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personality, and a t t r a c t i ~ nmajority
,~
jury verdict^,^ the import(1966); Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIOST.
L.J. 158 (1958); Kessler, The Social Psychology of Jury Deliberations, The Jury System
in America: A Critical Overview, 4 SAGECRIM.JUSTICE
SYS.ANNUALS
67 (1975); Kline &
Jess, Prejudicial Publicity: Its Effect on Law School Mock Juries, 43 JOURNALISM
Q. 113
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Kline & Jess]; Landy & Aronson, The Influence of the Character of the Criminal and His Victim on the Jury Decisions of Simulated Jurors, 5 J . EXP.
Soc. PSYCH.
141 (1969); Simon & Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof: A View from the
Bench, the Jury, and the Classroom, 5 L. & SOC'YREV.319 (1971); Simon & Marshall,
The Jury System, 1SAGECRIM.JUSTICE
SYS.ANNUALS
211 (1972); Strodtbeck & Hook, The
Social Dimensions of a Twelve-Man Jury Table, 24 SOCIOMETRY
397 (1961); Strodtbeck,
James & Hawkins, Social Status in Jury Deliberations, 22 AM. Soc. REV.713 (1957);
Vidmar, Effects of Decision Alternatives on the Verdicts and Social Perceptions of Simu& SOC.PSYCH.
211 (1972);Weld & Danzig, A Study of the Way
lated Jurors, 22 J . PERSON.
in Which a Verdict is Reached by a Jury, 53 AM. J . PSYCH.
518 (1940) [hereinafter cited
as Weld & Danzig]; Weld & Roff, A Study in the Formation of Opinion Based Upon Legal
Evidence, 51 AM.J. PSYCH.609 (1938) [hereinafter cited as Weld & Roa; Winter, The
Jury and the Risk of Nonpersuasion, 5 L. & SOC'YREV.335 (1971); Zeisel, Reflections on
Experimental Techniques in the Law, 2 J. LEGAL
STUDIES
107 (1973); Zeisel, What Determines the Amount of Argument Per Juror?, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 279 (1963); Margulies,
Defendants Aren't Always Innocent: T. V. 'Convicts' the Prosecution, Salt Lake Tribune,
March 16, 1975, 4 H, a t 9, col. 1.
8. E.g., R. Kukla & J. Kessler, The Influence of Physical Attractiveness on Decisions
of Simulated Jurors, Nov. 1973 (paper presented to the Speech Comm. Ass'n Conv., New
York); C. Stephan, Sex Prejudice in Jury Simulation, 1973 (paper presented at the Am.
Soc. Ass'n Conv., New York); C. Stephan & J . Tully, The Influence of Physical Attractiveness of a Plaintiff on the Decisions of Simulated Juries, 1973 (paper presented at No.
Central Soc. Ass'n Conv., Cincinnati); G. White, Sex Bias in Experimental Juries, 1970
(doctoral dissertation, University of Maryland); Becker, Hildrum & Bateman, The Influence of Jurors' Values on Their Verdicts: A Courts and Politics Experiment, 46 SW.SOC.
SCI.Q. 130 (1965); Broeder, Occupational Expertise and Bias as Affecting Juror Behavior:
A Preliminary Look, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV.1079 (1965); Broeder, Plaintiff$ Family Status as
Affecting Juror Behavior: Some Tentative Insights, 14 J . PUB.L. 131 (1965); Broeder,
Previous Jury Trial Service Affecting Juror Behavior, 506 INS.L.J. 138 (1965); Wend &
Vinson, Leaning Over Backwards: Juror's Responses to Defendant's Attractiveness, 24 J .
COMMUNICATIONS
124 (Summer 1974); Hartshome, Jury Verdicts: A Study of Their Characteristics and Trends, 35 A.B.A.J. 113 (1949); Hermann, Occupations of Jurors as an
Influence on Their Verdict, 5 FORUM
150 (1970); Mitchell & Byme, The Defendant's
Dilemma: Effects of Juror's Attitudes and Authoritarianism on Judicial Decisions, 25 J.
PERSON.
& SOC.PSYCH.123 (1973); Nagel & Weitzman, Sex and the Unbiased Jury, 78
CASE& COM.28 (Mar.-Apr. 1973); Reed, Jury Deliberations, Voting, and Verdict Trends,
45 Sw. Soc. SCI.Q. 361 (1965); Robinson, Bias, Probability and Trial by Jury, 15 AM.SOC.
REV.73 (1950); Stephan, Selective Characteristics of Jurors and Litigants: Their Influences on Jurys' Verdicts, The Jury System: A Critical Overview, 4 SAGECRIM.JUSTICE
SYS.
ANNUALS
95 (1975).
9. E.g., A. Padawer-Singer, Less Than Unanimous vs. Unanimous Jury Verdicts,
Dec. 1974 (paper presented to the Speech Comm. Ass'n Conv., Chicago); Barrow,
Conflicts in Jury Findings, 26 TEXAS
B.J. 23 (1963); Boone & Potts, Majority Verdicts for
Texas?, 6 TEXASB.J. 118 (1943); Bouchelle, Requirement of Consent of Three-Fourths of
Jury to Verdicts in Civil Actions, Abolishing Law of Unanimous Consent, 48 J. AM.JUD.
SOC'Y69 (1947); Ginsberg, Special Findings and Jury Unanimity in the Federal Courts,
65 COLUM.
L. REV.256 (1965);Haralson, Unanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Cases, 21
MISS.L.J. 185 (1950); Haralson, Why Veto Jury Verdicts?, 31 J. AM. JUD.SOC'Y(1947);
Icenogle, The Menace of the 'Hung Jury', 47 A.B.A.J. 280 (1961);Kun, Validity of Uanani-
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ance of jury instructions to the jury,1° jury size,ll and the importmous Verdict Requirements, 22 PA. B. ASS'NQ. 15 (1950); Weinstein, Trial by Jury and
Unanimous Verdicts, 69 U.S.L. REV.513 (1935); Winters, Majority Verdicts in the United
States, 26 J . AM. JUD.SOC'Y87 (1942); Comment, The Case for Retention of the UnaniL. REV.403 (1966); Comment, Civil Procedure-Less Than
mous Civil Jury, 15 DEPAUL
Unanimous Jury Verdicts, 27 N.C.L. REV.539 (1949); Comment, Compromise Verdicts
in Criminal Cases, 37 NEB.L. REV.802 (1958); 23 CALIF.L. REV.218 (1935); 10 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV.373 (1936); 26 WASH.L. REV. 56 (1951); Forston, Deliberation Time for NonUnanimous Verdicts, Des Moines Tribune, April 3, 1973, a t 8.
10. E.g., R. BRANSON,
THELAWOF INSTRUCTIONS
TO JURIES
IN CIVILAND CRIMINAL
CASES
THE JURY(1969) [hereinafter cited as
(1936); R. MCBRIDE,THE ART OF INSTRUCTING
MCBRIDE];F. Woleslagel, The 'Kiss' Principle of Jury Communication, July 1974 (address before the ABA Conv., Honolulu) [hereinafter cited as Woleslagel (1974)l; Broeder,
The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV.744 (1959); Forston, Judges'
Instructions: A Quantitative Analysis of Jurors' Listening Comprehension, 18 TODAY'S
SPEECH
34 (Fall 1970); Forston, Justice, Jurors, and Judges' Instructions, 12 JUDGES'
J . 68
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Forston (1973)l; Hervey, Jurors Look a t Our Judges, 18 OKLA.
B. ASS'N J . 1508 (1947); Hunter, Law in the Jury Room, 2 OHIOST. U.L.J. 1 (1935)
[hereinafter cited as Hunter]; Kline & Jess, supra note 7 a t 116; Meyer & Rosenberg,
105 (1971) [hereinafter
Questions Juries Ask: Untapped Springs of Insight, 55 JUDICATURE
cited as Meyer & Rosenberg]; O'Mara, The Courts, Standard Jury Charges-Findings of
Pilot Project, 43 PA.B. ASS'NQ. 166 (1972); O'Reilly, Why Some Juries Fail, 41 D.C.B.J.
69 (1974) [hereinafter cited as O'Reilly]; Sigworth, Arizona Uniform Jury Instructions,
8 ARIZ.B.J. 9 (Spring 1973) [hereinafter cited as Sigworth]; Comment, Study of the
North Carolina Jury Charge: Present Practice and Future Proposals, 6 WAKEFOREST
INTRA.L. REV.459 (1970) [hereinafter cited as North Carolina Jury Charge]; Comment,
On Instructing Deadlocked Juries, 78 YALEL.J. 100 (1968); Forston, Does the Jury Understand?-Usually Not, Des Moines Sunday Register, May 21, 1972, § c, a t 15.
11. E.g., J. Ahern, Communication in Juries: A Study of Decision-Making in Different Sized Groups, Dec. 1971 (paper presented to the Speech Comm. Ass'n Conv., San
Francisco); Gordon, supra note 6; J. Kessler, A Content Analytic Comparison of the Six
and Twelve-Member Jury Decision-Making Processes, 1973 (doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan); Augelli, Six-Member Juries in Civil Actions in the Federal Judicial
System, 3 SETONHALLL. REV.281 (1972); Beiser & Varrin, Six-Member Juries in the
Federal Courts, 58 JUDICATURE
424 (1975); Bond, On Six-Person Juries, 26 B. BULL.BOSTON
241 (1955); Cronin, Six-Member Juries in District Courts, 2 BOSTON
B.J. 27 (Apr. 1958);
Henchman, The New South Wales Jury of Four Persons, 33 AUSTRALIAN
L.J. 235 (1959);
Pabst, Statistical Studies of the Costs of Six-Man Versus Twelve-Man Juries, 14 WM. &
MARYL. REV.326 (1972); Pabst, What Do Six-Mem ber Juries Really Save?, 57 JUDICATURE
6 (1973); Phillips, A Jury of Six in All Cases, 30 CONN.B.J. 354 (1956); Pinsley, Number
of Jurors Required, 25 ILL.B.J. 114 (1936); Tamm, The Five-Man Civil Jury: A Proposed
Constitutional Amendment, 51 GEO.L.J. 120 (1962); Thompson, Six Will Do!, 10 TRIAL,
Nov.-Dec. 1974, a t 12; Wiehl, The Six-Man Jury, 4 GONZAGA
L. REV.35 (1968); Zeisel, . . .
And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38 U. CHI.L. REV.710
(1971); Zeisel, Twelve is Just, 10 TRIAL,Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 13 [hereinafter cited as
Zeisel]; Zeisel & Diamond, "Convincing Empirical Evidence" on the Six-Member Jury,
41 U. CHI.L. REV.281 (1974); Note, The Effect of Jury Size on the Probability of Conviction: An Evaluation of William u. Florida, 22 CASEW. RES. L. REV. 529 (1971); Note,
Constitutional Law--Jury of Less Than Twelve Men, 10 NOTREDAMELAW.61 (1934);
Note, An Empirical Study of Six and Twelve Member Jury Decision-Making Processes, 6
U. MICH.J.L. REFORM
712 (1973); Note, Reducing the Size of Juries, 5 U. MICH.J.L.
REFORM
87 (1971); Note, Six-Member and Twelve-Member Juries: An Empirical Study
of Trial Results, 6 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM
671 (1973); 15 CHI.-KENTL. REV.65 (1936); 10
IND.L.J. 259 (1935); 42 J. AM. JUD.SOC'Y136 (1958).
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ance of voir dire. l2
Unfortunately, this voluminous criticism and research has
done little to improve the jury system. Most of the recent research
has been designed, not to help jurors better perform their functions nor to improve the jury system, but rather to meet certain
administrative needs of the judicial system. The contention of
this article is that most of the research and criticism relating to
the jury system is therefore misdirected. Because juries are likely
to continue as a basic element in our system of justice,13 both
proponents and critics of the jury should be motivated to improve
the system in order to obtain the best it has to offer.
The facet of the jury system perhaps most in need of improvement is the communication process in jury trials.14Effective
-

12. Brill, Voir Dire-Examination

of Jurors, 29 Mo. L. REV.259 (1964); Broeder, Voir
Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL.L. REV.503 (1965); Busch, Selecting
the Jury, 47 ILL.B.J. 238 (1958); Carr, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors: An Appraisal by
an Attorney, 1963 U. ILL.L.F. 653; Crebs, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors: An Appraisal
by a Judge, 1963 U. ILL.L.F. 644; Doherty, Selection of Jury in a Criminal Case, 2 ILL.
305 (1960); Elam,
CONT.LEGAL
EDUC.103 (1964);Eddy, Challenges to Jurors, 229 L. TIMES
Techniques of Jury Selection from Plaintiff's Viewpoint; From Defendant's Viewpoint,
A.B.A. SEC.INS., NEG. & COMP.L. 354 (1965); Field, Voir Dire Examinations-A Neglected Art, 33 U. Mo. K.C.L. REV.171 (1965); Fried, Kaplin & Klein, Juror Selection,
SYS.
An Analysis of Voir Dire, the Jury System: A Critical Overview, 4 SAGECRIM.JUSTICE
ANNUALS
(1975); Hill, Effective Techniques of Jury Selection and Jury Argument in PerB.J. 221 (1958);Jones, Peremptory Challenges-Should Rule
sonal Injury Cases, 21 TEXAS
233 Be Changed?, 45 TEXAS
L. REV.80 (1966); Kaufman, The Judges and Jurors: Recent
Developments in Selection of Jurors and Fair Trial-Free Press, 41 U. COLO.L. REV.179
(1969);Lay, In a Fair Adversary System the Lawyer Should Conduct the Voir Dire ExamiJ . 63 (1974); Levit & Chernick, Trial Judges Should Connation of the Jury, 13 JUDGES'
duct Voir Dire Examination, 13 JUDGES'J . 65 (1974); Levit, Nelson, Ball & Chernick,
Expediting Voir Dire: An Empirical Study, 44 S. CAL.L. REV.916 (1971); Oberer, Does
Disqualification of Jurors for Scruples Against Capital Punishment Constitute Denial of
Fair Trial on Issue of Guilt?, 39 TEXASL. REV. 545 (1961); Padawer-Singer, Singer &
Singer, Voir Dire by Two Lawyers: An Essential Safeguard, 57 JUDICATURE
386 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Padawer-Singer]; Rothblatt, Techniques for Jury Selection, 2 CRIM.
L. BULL.NO. 4 a t 14 (1966); Schulman, Shaver, Colman, Emrich & Christie, Recipe for a
Jury, 7 PSYCH.
TODAY
37 (1973); Shepherd, Techniques of Jury Selection from Defendant's
Viewpoint, A.B.A. SEC.INS., NEG. & COMP.L. 359 (1965); Urbom, Picking a Jury and
Referring to Evidence, 46 NEB. L. REV.528 (1967); Comment, Jurors' Knowledge of the
L. REV.257 (1970); Note, Peremptory ChalLaw: Voir Dire on Jury Instructions, 7 IDAHO
lenges and Change of Venue, 27 U. CIN. L. REV.87 (1958); Criminal Procedure-State
Allowed Peremptory Challenge of Previously Accepted Juror After Defense Exhausted
Peremptory Challenges, 9 DEPAUL
L. REV.275 (1960).
13. See Zeisel, supra notell.
14. Telephone interview with Maurice Rosenberg (Nash Professor of Law, Columbia
Unviersity), Feb. 27, 1974. See also NAT'LCONF.OF STATETRIALJUDGES,
THESTATETRIAL
JUDGES'
BOOK165 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as THE STATETRIALJUDGES'BOOK];
W. PROBERT,
LAW,LANGUAGE
AND COMMUNICATION
(1972); Edises, One- Way CommunicaJ . 78 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
tions: Achille's Heel of The Jury System, 13 JUDGES'
MONTHLY
52 (Dec. 1974)
Edises]; Hacker, Who Killed Harry Gleason?, 234 ATLANTIC
[hereinafter cited as Hacker]; Rosenberg, Devising Procedures That Are Civil to Promote
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communication between the judge, lawyers, witnesses, and jury
is critical to the proper functioning of the system. It is self-evident
that if the communication process is not effective-if jurors are
unsure about the evidence, unclear on the meaning of the law,
confused by legal jargon, bewildered by trial procedure, or uncertain of the role they are to play-the jury cannot be expected to
perform its function intelligently.
The studies reported in this article indicate that such a condition of pervasive confusion does in fact exist among jurors in the
present jury system and is largely a result of poor communication.
Jurors often improperly find the facts because the concept of legal
evidence is seldom adequately communicated to them. They
often improperly apply the law because they are unable to comprehend the jury instructions. They often fail to rationally consider legal arguments because they have difficulty understanding
legal jargon. Also, time is often wasted in the deliberation room
because the jury does not fully understand its function.
The purpose of this article is to point out some of the jury
trial practices which "do not make sense" in light of current
communication theory and research and which adversely affect
a jury's performance. Toward that end, the article first discusses
two empirical studies which illustrate the juror confusion resulting from the present system of trial communication. The article
then suggests six areas in which jury trial communication could
be improved in order to alleviate such juror confusion: the wording of jury instructions, the timing of jury instructions, juror orientation, two-way communication, note taking, and juror selection.

A. Empirical Research I: Confusion in the Deliberation
The primary purpose of the first study considered was to
analyze three jury simulation techniques in order to estimate
their relative usefulness for further research into the decisionmaking processes in civil jury deliberations. The emphasis of the
study, therefore, was on the manner in which jurors process information, organize their deliberations, and arrive a t verdicts. A
Justice T h a t Is Civilized, 69 MICH.L. REV.797, 817 (1971); Rosenberg, N e w Challenges
and Responses In Resolving Civil Disputes, 1972 LAW & SOC.ORD.359, 368.
15. This research was funded by the Margaret H. and James E. Kelly Foundation,
Inc., and the Tozer Foundations, Inc.
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serendipitous by-product was the discovery of the difficulty jurors
had in the deliberation process as a result of confusion and misunderstanding of various legal concepts, trial procedures, and jury
instructions. These latter findings are the primary focus of this
article.
1. Procedures

a. Jury trial simulation. The sixteen juries studied each
participated in one of the three different types of simulation: six
were "fact sheet" juries (the jurors were provided with a summary
sheet of important facts and issues and with written jury instructions), six were "audio trial" juries (the jurors listened to a detailed audio recording of an edited trial), and four were "live
trial" juries (the jurors participated in an actual live trial situation). The simulation sessions were held in realistic settings utilizing a courtroom, bailiff, and jury room. In the live trial settings, an actual judge, attorneys, and witnesses were used as well.
All juries deliberated on the same essential set of facts taken
from an actual trial involving an automobile-pedestrian accident.
All subjects were regular county jurors from the Minneapolis and
Chicago areas who had been randomly selected from a larger jury
panel. Each twelve member jury's deliberation was videotaped.
Although the jurors were aware that they were being taped, the
equipment was inconspicuously placed, and procedures were developed to desensitize the jurors to the cameras.
b. Analysis techniques. The recordings of the deliberations
were quantitatively analyzed through a content analysis form
developed as a part of this study: the Civil Jury Deliberation
(CJD) Process Analysis. The CJD Processs Analysis is a specially
designed computer assisted content analysis technique for recording and quantifying each juror's comments as well as collectively
recording the process in which the jury reaches its decision. This
technique permits an empiricist to view the complex jury
decision-making process through an analytical approach which
uses three to six time phases, four general categories of comments
(substantive, procedural, disruptive, and immaterial), twenty
sub-categories, and three directional value judgements (positive,
negative, and neutral).18By the use of recordings and transcripts,
16. The Civil Jury Deliberation Process Analysis used the following breakdown for
quantitatively analyzing the jurors' deliberation:
SUBSTANTIVE (TASK)
(1) Credibility of witnesses (directional value judgments + o -);
o -);
(2) Credibility of attorneys (directional value judgments

+
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(3) Determination of plaintiff's liability claim and defendant's defenses (directional value judgments
o -);
(4) Determination of the extent of plaintiff's losses, injuries, and suffering
(directional value judgments + o -);
(5) Discussion regarding the amount of the award:
a. Discussion of award as a total sum rather than itemizing costs,
b. Itemization of damages,
(1) Property damages
(2) Loss of wages
(3) Medical costs
(4) Suffering
(5) Permanent injuries
(6) Other (specify)
(6) References about judge's instructions, rules or clarification; and definitions
of legal terms;
(7) Comments about lack of evidence, missing facts, or experimental conditions;
PROCEDURAL (TASK)
(8) Selection of foreman;
(9) Procedural planning;
(10) Voting on liability, negligence, or related issues leading to liability determination;
(11) Voting for an award or related issues leading to the amount of the award;
DISRUPTIVE (NON-TASK)
(12) Disruptive;
IMMATERIAL (NON-TASK)
(13) Discussion of trial and nontrial functionaries' reputations and/or personalities, (directional value judgements + o -);
Discussion
of
insurance
or
the
party's
ability
to pay or absorb a financial
(14)
amount, (directional value judgments + o -);
(15) References to attorneys' fees;
(16-17) Special immaterial categories (which are defined as prominent immaterial issues) arise from various individual trials' (directional value judgment

+

+0

-);

(18) Other miscellaneous immaterial comments;
(19) Social-emotional interaction and joking;
(20) Consideration of the spirit of law and the pragmatic necessity for comparative negligence.
Substantive content related to the verdict (task) in a direct way and often contributed
direct insights which led to some change in the group's perception of the verdict. Content
which clearly seemed to pertain to one of the seven substantive categories was easily
identified as substantive content. For example, a statement such as "The blonde witness
was probably in the best position to see the color of the traffic light" was classified as
category 1 (witness credibility) of the substantive aggregated category.
Procedural content related to the (task) verdict in a n indirect way; such a contribution was not meant to provide a change in the direction of the verdict. Procedural comments were statements about the group's operation (e.g., "What should we discuss
next?"-category 9). All voting processes were classified as procedural.
The disruptive category was used when the jury no longer functioned as a unit but
broke into sub-group discussions for prolonged periods of time (over seven seconds).
Immaterial content was non-task comment which was contrary to the rules of law as
stated in the judge's instructions or which was clearly non-task oriented such as a social
facilitation comment to another member (e.g., "That certainly is a pretty dress you have
on today,"-category 19).
For a comparison of another kind of content analysis of jury deliberations see R.
OPPORTUNITIES
AND
Simon, Trial by Jury: A Critical Assessment, in APPLIEDSOCIOLOGY:
PROBLEMS
297 (S. Miller & A. Gouldner eds. 1965).
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an investigator codes each juror's comments in the above terms
and measures the length of each statement in seconds.17 This
numerical data can be analyzed with various statistical manipulations.
In addition to the quantitative analysis, repeated observations of the videotaped jury deliberations and information obtained from questionnaires completed by each juror permitted an
extensive qualitative case study analysis of each jury.ls
2. Results and discussion

a. Quantitative analysis. The distribution of the typical
jury's communication, as measured in time and converted into a
percentage of the total deliberation time, was most frequently
found in eleven sub-categories as shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1
Distribution of Mean Percentages of
Jury Deliberation Time for Various Categories
Category

Description
Witness Credibility Discussion
Attorneys: Discussion
Determination of Liability
Determination of Plaintiff's Losses
& Injuries
Jury Instructions
Lack of Evidence in Trial
Procedural Planning (Voting)
Comments about Insurance
Comments about Attorney's fees
Other Misc. Immaterial Comments
Social-Emotional Interaction (Jurors)

Percentage

I

t

As can be seen from categories 1, 3, and 4, two-thirds of the
typical jury's time was spent trying to evaluate and determine the
facts of the case, while almost another 10 percent of the jury's
time was spent applying the rules of law as presented in the jury
instructions (category 6).
The deliberation time spent on jury instructions (category 6)
warrants closer scrutiny. Some juries were given only oral instruc17. The final inter-coder reliability agreement on the category system was 95.0 percent, and the agreement for directional value judgments was 81.2 percent.
18. See text accompanying notes 20-24 infra. Detailed case study analysis of the
sixteen juries is available in Forston (1968), supra note 7, a t 172.
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tions, while other juries received both oral and written instructions. Those juries that received only oral instructions, spent but
6 percent of their time attempting to understand and apply rules
of law. In contrast, those that received written instructions spent
more than twice as much time (14 percent) applying the law.
While this difference in time expended attempting to apply jury
instructions is itself significant, the merits of the written charges
over the oral charges were even more dramatically revealed by the
subsequent qualitative analysis which is reported below.
Immaterial comments about insurance, attorney fees, and so
forth (categories 14, 15, and 18) account for 2.1 percent of the
deliberation time. The study revealed t h a t when immaterial
statements were made, other jurors usually interrupted in order
to point out that consideration of immaterial matters constituted
improper deliberation. This was particularly common in juries
which had written instructions.
Discussion about a lack of evidence (category 7) often consisted of jurors expressing a desire to have been allowed to ask
"obvious questions" during the trial. This concern was also made
manifest by a desire to have the deliberating jury ask the judge
for more information or clarification. However, only one jury decided to ask a formal question. Most jurors were discouraged from
asking questions because judges had the reputation of refusing to
re~pond.'~
b. Qualitative analysis. Qualitative analysis of the juries'
performances revealed that the juries that had been provided
with written copies of instructions for each juror were more efficient and exhibited higher quality deliberations. Jurors with written instructions made fewer explicit comments about confusion,
spent less time inappropriately applying the law, wasted less time
trying to ascertain the meaning of the instructions, and concentrated more on relevant facts and proper application of the law.
Also, jurors provided with written charges exhibited more confidence that they had reached the best decision.
Additionally, qualitative analysis revealed numerous instances of individual juror's misunderstanding, as well as entire jury
confusion, over legal terminology, trial procedures, jury instructions, and jury room procedures. For instance, one-third of the
juries studied had difficulty understanding and applying the doctrine of contributory negligence. This difficulty was illustrated by
--

19. A jury's reluctance to return to a judge for help is a common problem according
to KALVEN
& ZEISEL, supra note 1, a t 510, and North Carolina Jury Charge, supra note
10, a t 461.
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the phrasing of questions upon which jurors voted. One foreman,
for example, asked the jury to respond to the following question:
"Who was at fault-the car, the plaintiff, or question mark (undecided)?" Some jurors were asked to choose between the following options: "defendant guilty" or "defendant not guilty." None
of these problem questions voted on by the juries demonstrates a
proper understanding of contributory negligence. Most juries finally seemed to work out the confusion over contributory negligence, but some deliberated erroneously about this concept for
nearly an hour. Again, those juries with written instructions were
consistently able to resolve confusion more quickly than those
that only heard oral instructions.
Instances of confusion over abstract legal phrases and jury
instructions were numerous. The application of concepts such as
proximate cause, preponderance of evidence, contributory negligence, and how monetary damages should be determined were
frequent sources of misunderstandings. The significance of this
confusion is partly illustrated by the fact that, while confrontations between individual jurors might be expected when the jury
is discussing issues or values involved in a case, this study revealed that a substantial amount of juror confrontation was the
direct result of trying to understand or apply legal terms or procedures which were confusing.20
Confusion also resulted from seemingly clear instructions
describing deliberation procedures. In three juries the jurors were
asked to vote by secret ballot and to make a letter "P" for plaintiff or a letter "D" for defendant. Some jurors printed "D" because they thought t h e defendant was guilty and should pay
damages; others printed "D" because they thought the defendant
was not liable and deserved to win the case. In one jury when the
20. Excerpts from the jury deliberations illustrate some of the confusion and confrontation.
A juror talking to the foreman about contributory negligence:
Juror: "We are not attorneys, and you're talking like an attorney to me. I don't
understand what you're talking about really. [Pause] Do You?"
Foreman: "Are you talking about me?"
Juror: [Pointing his finger at the foreman] "Yes! I don't understand this.
This is legal terms; it isn't everyday terms. I'm trying to learn something."
Another jury was having problems understanding and following the judge's instructions. This jury had been supplied with only one copy of written instruction. The foreman
was planning to read again from the instructions, when a juror stopped him to say: "You
have already read them to me ten times, and I already have them crushed into my mind."
Note that the last noted example may also indicate a problem with providing only
one copy of the written instructions rather than enough copies for all jurors. In juries which
had written copies for all jurors, this kind of confrontation never occurred.
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secret ballots were being tallied, a juror said: "Well, I meant the
opposite with my 'D' so put it in the 'P' pile.''
One of the conclusions of this study, based on both quantitative and qualitative analysis, was that jury instructions, when
understood, have considerable influence on the decision-making
of juries. The use of jury instructions as a basis for his reasoning
universally enhanced the cogency of a juror's argument. Significantly, no jury disregarded a juror's argument supported by the
rules of law as explained in the jury instructions in favor of another juror's argument which was incompatible with those instruction~.~~
The study also tested the hypothesis t h a t the predeliberation preferences of individual jurors (as obtained by questionnaires administered after the deliberation^)^^ accurately indicate the direction of the final jury verdict. This hypothesis proved
to be a good predictor for the direction of jury verdicts for more
than 86 percent of the juries.23 Other studies corroborate this
conclusion and afford further insight by revealing that the vast
majority of jurors reach a fairly definite decision before all the
evidence has been presented in the trial.24These collective preferences typically predetermine the final verdict.

B. Empirical Research 11: Misunderstanding of Jury
Instructions
The second series of research projects to be considered in this
article focused on jurors' comprehension and application of jury
instructions. The descriptive research questions for investigating
the problem of juror confusion were:
(1) What percentage of the jury instructions do individual
jurors retain and comprehend?
21. This finding on the influence of jury instructions is supported by the conclusions
of Kline & Jess, supra note 7, at 116, but is a t odds with the survey information collected
& ZEISEL,supra note 1,
by the University of Chicago Jury Project, as reported in KALVEN
and Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV.744, 751 (1959).
22. The questionnaire on pre-deliberation preference and other information was not
administered to the jurors before the deliberation in order to avoid possible contamination
of the jury deliberation.
23. This percentage figure is based on the combined results of studies of twenty-two
juries (sixteen juries from the original study and six juries from a later follow-up study).
24. See, e.g., James, supra note 3, at 569; KALVEN
& ZEISEL,supra note 1, at 487;
SIMON,
supra note 3, at 117; Stone, A Primary Effect in Decision-Making by Jurors, 19 J.
COMMUNICATIONS
239 (Sept. 1969); Weld & Danzig, supra note 7; Weld & Roff, supra note
7; Blade, Professor [Harry Kalven]: Juries Often Decide Early, Minneapolis Star, July
29, 1967, 4 A, a t 9. Compare the above cited studies with the following which is tangentially related but has some findings which are in disagreement: Lawson, The Law of
Primacy in the Criminal Courtroom, 77 J. Soc. PSYCH.121 (1969).
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(2) What percentage of the jury instructions do face-to-face
deliberating juries retain and comprehend?
1. Procedures

Two sets of jury instructions were obtained from the Polk
County District Court in Des Moines, Iowa: instructions for a
civil personal injury case and instructions for a criminal murder
case. A total of 114 experienced Polk County jurors participated
in this study on their last day of jury service. The group was
divided into two smaller groups of 54 and 60 jurors. One group of
jurors participated in the civil case and the other participated in
the criminal case. The jurors were never told that their comprehension of jury instructions would be tested.
An investigator gave the jurors of each large group detailed
background information pertaining to the case to which they were
assigned so that the jurors could relate the jury instructions to a
concrete factual situation. Next, the investigator read the appropriate set of jury instructions to each of the groups. Immediately
after the reading of the instructions, a multiple choice retentioncomprehension test based on the instructions was administered
to each individual juror. Each test consisted of fifteen multiple
choice questions. Each question had five possible answers, thus
establishing a guess chance of 20 percent.
Following the test, the jurors were randomly divided into
face-to-face deliberating panels of six jurors. Each jury was given
the same test that the jurors had individually taken, and assigned
the task of reaching a unanimous group decision on each of the
fifteen questions.
This testing of the jurors' comprehension of judicial instructions was conducted under almost ideal conditions: the jurors
were experienced (nearing the end of a three-week term); the
instructions were short (both sets were approximately 20 minutes
in length); the instructions involved relatively ordinary issues
rather than complex issues; the experimental research took place
during the morning, while the jurors should have been mentally
alert; and the comprehension test measured immediate rather
than delayed comprehension.
An earlier study using identical research procedures was conducted for comparative purposes using 106 Drake University and
Grandview College students as jurors.
2. Results and discussion

The results of the two studies of juror comprehension are
revealed in Table 2.
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TABLE 2
Individual Jurors' and Deliberating Juries' Mean Percent of
Compensation for Civil, Criminal and Combined,
Jury Instructions

County
Jurors
Students

Combined
Instructions

Criminal
Instructions

Civil
Instructions
Individual
Jurors

Deliberating
Juries

Individual
Jurors

Deliberating
Juries

Individual
Jurors

Deliberating
Juries

(Percent)

(Percent)

(Percent)

(Percent)

(Percent)

(Percent)

46.0
71.3

60.1
80.6

53.12"
59.8

63.3
82.9

49.9
67.1

61.8
81.5

As indicated by the table, the deliberating juries scored 10
to 14 percentage points above the mean of individual jurors. This
improved performance is probably attributable to an "assembly
effect" resulting from the face-to-face i n t e r a ~ t i o n . ~ ~
Mean comprehension levels achieved by the county jurors
should be viewed as more valid indicators of an actual jury situation than the student comprehension levels. This is because the
former represent more closely the demographic characteristics
which would be present in any actual jury. The student data were
included for the comparative purpose of showing the effects of
higher education on the understanding of jury instructions and
trial procedure. One implication that might be drawn from the
substantially higher student scores on the comprehension test is
that systematically excusing our better educated citizens from
jury duty makes an important difference in the ability of the jury
to perform its expected function.27
Analysis of the individual jurors' understanding of the jury
instructions shows that some parts of the instructions were more
confusing than others. For example, 85 percent of the jurors
missed at least one question on what constitutes evidence and 37
--

-

-

-

25. The Sigworth study, described in the text accompanying notes 29-32 infra, examined criminal jury instructions only, but came to an amazingly similar juror comprehension level of 52.1 percent.
26. The "assembly effect" occurs when a group of persons is able to achieve collectively something which could not have been achieved by one person working alone. For a
discussion of the "assembly effect" see B. COLLINS
& H. GUETZKOW,
A SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY
OF GROUP
PROCESS
FOR DECISION-MAKING
58 (1964).
27. This writer has no explanation for the differences in percentages between civil and
criminal cases, except for the fact that one set of instructions may have been more complex than the other. One would not, however, ordinarily expect one kind of instruction to
be inherently more complex than another; a larger sample of cases will have to be investigated before a conclusion can be reached.
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percent missed two out of the three questions about evidence.
Also, nearly three-fourths of the jurors could not choose the correct response to the question pertaining to proximate cause.
Similar results were obtained from analysis of the juries' performances. Even under the favorable conditions of immediate
recall and group interaction, 86 percent of the criminal juries were
unable to respond accurately to what is proof of guilt, and over
one-half of the civil juries did not correctly answer the question
on proximate cause. The most shocking discovery was that fourfifths of the juries missed one or more of the three questions on
evidence. Since juries are expected to weigh the relevant evidence
presented and ignore both immaterial and illegitimate sources of
information, the confusion over what is and what is not evidence
may be grounds for serious concern, especially where pre-trial
publicity is involved.
3. Related studies

The results of the above-described study are similar to those
reached in certain other empirical studies. One such study found
that up to 85 percent of the jurors tested could not choose correct
definitions of the following terms:28
Inference
Impeach
Stipulate
Voir Dire
Proximate Cause
Circumstantial
Probative

Included Offense
Criminal Intent
Specific Intent
Material Allegation
Preponderance of Evidence
Conflictive

A second study presented legal concepts and other words
commonly found in instructions to jurors and empirically tested
their understanding of the terms. Some of the results obtained
give rise to concern. For instance, while 58 percent of the jurors
tested selected the correct meaning of "speculate," 28 percent
thought that the word meant either to examine or c ~ n c l u d e . ~ "
This simple example suggests that it would be unwise for a judge
to instruct jurors "not to speculate."
By way of further example, the same study demonstrated
that while two-thirds of the jurors understood what "presumed to
28. This study is reported in O'Reilly, supra note 10, a t 73.
29. H. Sigworth & F. Henze, Jurors' Comprehension of Jury Instructions in Southern
Arizona, appendix C, a t 3 (1973) (unpublished report) [hereinafter cited as Sigworth &
Henze] .
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be innocent" meant, and only two percent reported that the defendant must in any way prove his own innocence, fully one-third
of the jurors tested agreed that "when the state has finished
presenting its evidence, you must wait to see if the defendant can
prove he is innocent." Similarly, although three-quarters of the
jurors correctly understood that they must come to a unanimous
verdict, 20 percent thought that a non-unanimous verdict was
sufficient for a not-guilty verdict. Still other studies have found
that jurors frequently have an intellectual understanding of a
legal term or procedure but are unable to apply it.30
It is significant to note that two of the studies described in
this section reach the conclusion that prior jury deliberation experience helped improve jurors' understanding of instructions by
5 to 10 percent.31One study found the most dramatic improvement (almost 20 percent) among jurors who had taken the same
test before.32This last noted rate of improvement is encouraging
because it indicates that after repeated exposure jurors are willing
to listen more carefully to instructions and information in order
to clarify points.

II. POSSIBLE
SOLUTIONS:
SIXAREAS
FOR IMPROVING
COMMUNICATION
IN JURY
TRIALS
The studies described above reveal a sustantial amount of
confusion in the jury deliberation process which can largely be
attributed to a failure on the part of courts to communicate effectively with jurors. It is self-evident that this confusion cannot
help but interfere with the proper functioning of the jury. If the
jury is to be preserved as a basic part of our system of justice, it
is essential that attention be directed toward improving the effectiveness of communication in trials. The following sections of this
article present suggestions for improving trial communication.
These suggestions relate to the wording of jury instructions, the
timing of jury instructions, juror orientation, two-way communication, note-taking, and juror selection.
A. T h e Wording of Jury Instructions
1. T h e problem of legalese
Jury instructions are intended to delineate the issues involved in a case, and to inform the jury of the applicable rules of
30. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 10.
31. O'Reilly, supra note 10, at 74; Sigworth, supra note 10, at 23.
32. Sigworth, supra note 10, at 23.
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law. The above studies, however, demonstrate that typical instructions do not adequately achieve these goals.33Instead they
often leave the jurors confused over such fundamental legal concepts as the meaning of evidence or negligence. Much of this
misunderstanding can be traced to the legal jargon used in the
instructions which, although technically correct, is largely meaningless to a jury of laymen.
The literature is rich with those who complain of the legalese
used in triak3' The opinions of these critics are strongly supported by the studies described above. In fact, all jury studies to
date, but for a single exception,35reach the conclusion that legalese in trials, particularly as contained in jury instructions, is
neither adequately understood nor properly applied by jurors.
In addition, jurors themselves are asking for better instructions. In one
80 percent of the jurors surveyed found
substantial room for improvement in jury instructions. Almost
three-fourths of those jurors specifically recommended the judge
give less complicated instructions and that the jurors be given the
opportunity to ask clarifying questions before retiring to the jury
room.37
The challenging solution to this widely recognized problem
is to draft substantively correct instructions which are sufficiently clear and understandable that lay jurors can apply them
in the deliberation process. This solution is complicated by the
fact that jury instructions must be able to pass the scrutiny of an
appellate court and be found technically accurate. Such accuracy
33. See text accompanying notes 20 and 25-32 supra.
34. John H. Holloway, while Executive Director of the Oregon State Bar Association,
spoke of lawyers using "high sounding phrases, managing to say in fifty words what could
76 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WOLESLAGEL
have been said in seven." F. WOLESLAGEL,
JURY
(1972)l. Justice Benjamin Cardozo often referred to legal writing as being "so overloaded
with all its possible qualifications that it will tumble down of its own weight." R. FLESCH,
WRITING
111 (1949). Charles Joiner has argued:
THEARTOF READABLE

One of the weaknesses of jury decision-making lies in the instructions on the law
given the jury a t the close of a case. . . . On the whole, judges have done a very
poor job of instructing. Some of them ramble on interminably, using legal language not easily understood by the jury, which not uncommonly fails to grasp
some significant question of law as a result. If better verdicts are to be had,
attention must be given to the instructional process.
AND THE JURY
83 (1962).
C. JOINER,
CIVILJUSTICE
35. Moffat, As Jurors See a Lawsuit, 24 ORE.L. REV.199 (1945). Moffat's study has
a serious defect in that he asked only attitude questions, which were too general to be of
any specific help regarding understanding of the instructions. No attempt was made to
test the effectiveness with which the jurors tried to apply the law.
36. O'Reilly, supra note 10. For a description of this study, see the text accompanying
notes 31 & 32 supra.
37. O'Reilly, supra note 10, a t 73-74.
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is most difficult to achieve without using legal terms of art which
have precise meaning to members of the legal profession. Unfortunately these same terms are very confusing to the vast majority
of lay jurors.38As stated in the California Jury Instructions:
It has been bruited that instructions are written in English that
is too good, too highbrow; they ought to be written in the language of the street. . . . No one, for us a t least, ever has taken
one of our instructions and translated it into the language of the
street still correctly stating the law.3g

2. Pattern instructions

One possible means of improvement lies in the area of uniform or pattern jury instructions. Thirty states have adopted
their use in civil trials, and drafting projects are planned or underway in ten othem40Some federal court judges are also making
use of standard instruction guides.41
The pattern instruction movement constitutes a giant step
toward making instructions more understandable to laymen. For
example, the Arizona Jury Instruction Project empirically tested
drafts of that state's patterned instructions to discover vocabulary and legal concepts which were confusing to jurors. The most
38. Judge Robert McBride described the dilemma a trial judge faces in trying to
communicate with jurors and with appellate courts:
The oral delivery of instructions justifies resorting to the best and most
effective use of language available. Every instruction is a test of the skill and
art of the judge, a test which is not graded in points or personal success, but by
justice between the parties.
Instructions must meet still another test. They must be approved for technical accuracy by the reviewing court. This additional test discourages the preparation of instructions for effective oral use in the courtroom. It frightens new
judges to the point that the necessity for comprehension bjr the jurors is ignored.
How well a judge succeeds in conveying his message to twelve captive
listeners may determine the verdict. There is no opportunity to rehearse, edit
or improve the immediate product. There is no examination of the jurors to find
out if the message was effective. The success of any instruction to a jury is not
reflected in its brilliance or in its eloquence but by a fair and just verdict.

....
Ordinary language requires all the skill of a master of the law and the
ingenuity of a professional author. We must keep in mind the limited time at
the judge's disposal and the tremendous gap he must bridge to bring the specific
law to the jury. Certainly it must be accurate, but if it fails to bridge the gap it
might as well not be given. Comprehension of the jury and not approval by the
reviewing court is the first objective.
R. MCBRIDE,
THEARTOF INSTRUCTING
THE JURY
180, 191 (1969).
39. CALIFORNIA
JURYINSTRUCTIONS:
44 Civil (4th ed.).
JUDICATURE
40. J . ALFINI,PATTERNJURYINSTRUCTIONS
REPORTNO. 6, AMERICAN
SOCIETY
4 (1972) [hereinafter cited as ALFINI].
41. Id. a t 39; WOLESLAGEL
(1972), supra note 34, at 80; Meyer, Pattern Instructions
JUDGES'
J . 1 (1966); Meyer & Rosenberg, supra note 10, a t 105.
Perfected, 55 TRIAL
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frequent problem areas of the instructions were redrafted to avoid
troublesome vocabulary. The redrafted instructions were tested
again for juror comprehension; the results were e n ~ o u r a g i n g . ~ ~
Other states have also used resourceful and imaginative
methods in an endeavor to improve their jury instructions. Montana has employed a communication specialist on the drafting
committee.43 Oregon has also utilized a speech communcation
specialist to assay the juror's comprehension of instructions by
using systematic, post-verdict interviews and experiments with
simulated juries .44
On the other hand, judges should not assume that all instructions taken from a uniform or pattern jury instruction guide book
are necessarily understandable to jurors or contain the best
phrasing with which to instruct a
Some recent pattern
instructions were used in several jury instruction
including those described above which indicated a serious need for
clearer instructions. In addition, judges need to avoid using the
pattern jury guide books in a "cut and paste" manner with no
system, transitions, or logical arrangement for jurors to readily
understand/'
3.

Written instructions

Another means of improving the jury's ability to understand
and apply jury instructions is to provide the jury with written
copies of their instructions for use during deliberation. Approximately twenty states use written instructions, but only sixteen
permit them to be taken into the jury room? Many federal and
state courts do not allow written instructions a t all. And yet, as
the research reported above has i n d i ~ a t e d the
, ~ ~ advantages of
using written instructions are dramatic. In the first study, those
juries supplied with written instructions spent more than twice
as much deliberation time specifically applying the rules of law
as did the juries that only heard oral instructions. A by-product
42. Sigworth, supra note 10, a t 9.
43. Meyer & Rosenberg, supra note 10, a t 106.
44. Id.
45. S e e MCBRIDE,
supra note 10, a t 183; WOLESLAGEL
(1972), supra note 34, at 80-81.
46. Pattern instructions were used in all the studies by O'Reilly, Sigworth, Forston
and O'Mara.
supra note 10, a t 183.
47. See ALFINI,supra note 40, a t 13-16; MCBRIDE,
48. Maloney, Should Jurors Have Written Instructions?, 6 TRIALJUDGES'
J. 18 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Maloney]. See also Cunningham, Should Instructions Go Into the
Jury Room?, 33 CAL.S.B.J. 278 (1958); Comment, T h e Jury Instruction Process-Apathy
or Aggressive Reform?, 49 MARQ.L. REV.137 (1965).
49. See text accompanying notes 19 and 20 supra.
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of this application was a more efficient and higher quality deliberation process. Furthermore, the jurors using written charges
exhibited more confidence that they had reached the best decision. Similarly, another study, not reported herein, found that
allowing written instructions in the jury room results in a 12
percent improvement in juror comprehen~ion.~~
Moreover, many
jurors want written instructions before them-more than 45 percent of the jurors surveyed in two studies strongly recommended
that instructions be submitted in written form?
Although no research has concluded that oral instructions
are in any way superior to written instructions, many trial judges
oppose giving written instructions to jurors. One study reports
that objecting judges said it would require more work and involve
delay for the judge to first deliver instructions orally and then
wait for them to be typed.52Of course, no such problem would be
encountered if the judge simply read a previously prepared set of
written instructions to the jury and then supplied them with
copies. As recognized in T h e State Trial Judges' Book, such a
practice would likely result in the use of more complete, cohesive,
understandable, and unrepetitive i n s t r ~ c t i o n . ~ ~
Other judges argue that if written charges are used, the jury
will read only a portion of what is given them in writing, and then
give that portion undue emphasis. However, this risk seems no
greater than the risk that jurors will remember only a part of an
oral charge and give the remembered part undue emphasis.54Finally, the fear that written instructions will give an advantage to
literate jurors, or those with good eyesight, can be allayed by
making the instructions available to the jury in the form of tape
recordings or video tape." A corollary to this last noted concern
is that when written instructions are used, each juror should be
given a copy to avoid the danger that the person with the only
copy of the instructions will dominate the deliberation?

B. T h e Timing of Jury Instructions
1. T h e "rules at the end of the game" problem
Typically, a judge instructs a jury orally for ten minutes to
50. Sigworth & Henze, supra note 29, at 7.
51. Maloney, supra note 48, at 18; O'Reilly, supra note 10, at 74.
52. Maloney, supra note 48, at 18.
53. THESTATE
TRIAL
JUDGES'
BOOK,
supra note 14, at 159-60.
54. Id.
55. See Katz, Reinstructing the Jury by Tape Recording, 41 J. AM. JUD.SOC'Y
148
(1958); Meyer & Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 107.
56. See note 20 supra; Forston (1973), supra note 10, at 69.
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two hours5' after all the evidence and closing arguments have
been presented. The instructions generally define what is and
what is not evidence, point out the central issues, present the
applicable law, and describe the function of the jury. Thus, it is
not until the last minutes of the trial that the jury is told the
"rules of the game."58The problem was well stated by the Honorable E. Barrett Prettyman, formerly of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia:
[ a t makes no sense to have a juror listen to days of testimony only then to be told that he and his confreres are the sole
judges of the facts, that the accused is presumed to be innocent,
that the government must prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, etc. What manner of mind can go back over a stream of
conflicting statements of alleged facts, recall the intonations,
the demeanor, or even the existence of the witnesses, and retrospectively fit all these recollections into a pattern of evaluation and judgment given him for the first time after the events?
The human mind cannot do so. It is not a magnetized tape from
which recorded speech can be repeated a t chosen speed and
volume. The fact of the matter is that this order of procedure
makes much of the trial of a lawsuit mere mumbo jumbo. It
sounds all right to the professional technicians who are the judge
and the lawyers. It reads all right to the professional technicians
who are the court of appeals. But to the laymen sitting in the
box, restricted to listening, the whole thing is a fog.5B

It is hardly surprising that juries often have questions regarding
what constitutes evidence, what the legal issues are, and how the
law relates to the facts of the case.
The argument for changing the timing of instructions is even
more compelling in light of research indicating that jurors are
unable to suspend their decisions until the end of the trial?
Clearly, if jurors make their decision as the evidence is being
presented, as some research indicates they do, a charge at the end
of a long trial comes too late to have much effect.
2.

Opening and closing jury instructions
Discussion about the timing of instructions has focused on

57. For example, in the "Harrisburg Seven" trial in 1972, the jury was given two
hours of instruction by the judge.
58. Prettyman, Jury Instructions-First or Last?, 46 A.B.A.J. 1066 (1960).
59. Id. Others have expressed concerns similar to Judge Prettyman's regarding the
timing of jury instructions.See, e.g., J. FRANK,
COURTS
ON TRIAL,
117 (1949);Hacker, supra
(1972)
note 14, at 56; North Carolina Jury Charge, supra note 10, at 462; WOLESLAGEL
supra note 34, at 57.
60. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra. See also Luck, supra note 7, at 90.
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two alternatives: providing instruction at the end of the trial or
both at the beginning and-the end of the trial. No one seriously
suggests omitting final instructions. Final instructions provide an
essential summary of the issues and the applicable law and are
most appropriate just prior to jury deliberation, as they leave the
most important concepts of the case fresh in jurors' minds. However, note that providing additional instruction at the beginning
of the trial would sacrifice none of the benefits of closing instructions, but would add the benefit of explaining the responsibilities
and functions of the jurors a t the outset. Opening instruction
could also give the jurors a basic understanding of the trial which
is about to be presented. The importance of this practice is clear
when one realizes that few jurors have served before and most are
unfamiliar with, or have distorted expectations as to, jury trial
proceeding^.^'

Continuing jury instructions
A third alternative, the option of giving "continuing instructions" a t various stages of the trial, on a "need to know" basis,
coupled with a final summarizing charge,62should also be given
consideration. Such a practice would best enable the jury to
apply the instructions to the relevant facts of the case and would
be much more effective than requiring jurors to try, over long
hours of testimony, to determine how a particular instruction is
relevant.
Judge George R. Triplett of Elkins, West Virginia, has suggested four stages of a trial a t which continuing instructions
might be introduced to aid the jury: orientation instructions prior
to the voir dire examination; admonitions, descriptions, and definitions prior to opening arguments; admonitions at each recess
and adjournment; and the final charge a t the close of the trial.63
Not all types of instructions would be appropriate for preliminary or continuing instructions. For example, no instruction that
pertains to evidence not yet presented in the case should be given
.~~
most
by way of preliminary or continuing i n s t r u c t i ~ nHowever,
jurists and commentators recognize that cautionary instructions,
3.

61. Geller, Experience and Reflections of a Trial Judge, 21 N.Y. COUNTY
A.B. BULL.
118 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Geller].
62. See Richards, Preliminary Jury Instructions, 11 JUDGES'
J. 33 (1972).
63. Triplett, Meaningful Jury Instructions at Various Stages of Trial, 13 JUDGES'
J.
37 (1974) [hereinafter cited as niplett]. See also Geller, supra note 61, at 118; McKenzie,
JUDGES'
J. 4 (1967) [hereinafter cited as McKenThe Judge-A Mere Referee?, 6 TRIAL
zie].
64. See Triplett, supra note 63, at 38.

6011

JURY TRIAL COMMUNICATION

623

matters concerning witness credibility, and definitions of terms
are proper subjects of instruction to the jury before evidence is
heardF Similarly, when evidence is admitted for a limited purpose, the judge should make that fact clear to the jury then and
not wait until the final charge to do so.' Also, many confusing
trial procedures such as the use of the hypothetical question or
the functions of depositions and interrogatories, should be explained a t the time they are introduced." Such explanations
would definitely help jurors to understand trial procedures and
legal terms and concepts-three areas of much juror confusion.

C. Juror Orientation
1. The problem of confusion over trial procedures
Closely allied to the need for improving the substance of jury
instructions is the need to provide juror orientation. Much of the
confusion which can be alleviated by improved instructions may
be further clarified by providing good quality juror orientation.
Inadequate orientation often leads to misunderstandings regarding trial procedure^,^^ frustration over trial delays," and confusion
when jurors are confronted with the legalese used throughout the
trial and in the jury instruction^.^^ These three sources of confusion and frustration can be dealt with by adopting the philosophy
that the first requirement for a quality jury trial is meaningful
juror orientation.
The need for orientation is generally well accepted, as indicated by the following statement from The State Trial Judges'
Book recognizing the value of jury orientation:
[The judge] should . . . be alert to ways in which the jury can
be made a more effective instrument in the administration of
justice.

....
. . . The trial judge should remember that jurors come to

court without preparation, without orientation, without knowledge of law or its procedures, unfamiliar with court atmosphere,
65. See Musser, Instructing the Jury-Pattern Instructions, 9 AM.JUR.TRIALS
923,
939-40 (1967).
66. Id.
67. See McKenzie, supra note 63, at 5.
68. Forston (1973), supra note 10, at 18; Forston (1968), supra note 7, at 67.
69. See Connelly, Jury Duty-The Juror's View, 55 JUDICATURE
118 (1971); Irate
Woman Says Jurors Herded Like Animals, Des Moines Tribune, April 15, 1974, at 2, col.
1; The Jilted Jurors, Wall Street J., Dec. 14, 1972, at 16, col. 1.
70. See note 10 supra.
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demeanor or decorum, and unacquainted with the precise manner of their selection or the specific purpose of this intrusion
upon their time.

....

...

He [the judge] should attempt to enrich the
knowledge of jurors, to the end that they will better understand
the system and workings of our courts and will be prepared to
assume and discharge . . . the important duties assigned to
them."

2.

Survey research: The Pre-Service Juror Orientation Project

In the autumn of 1974, a Pre-Service Juror Orientation Project was conducted which utilized a stratified random sampling
questionnaire to survey the use of various jury orientation training procedure^.'^ The random stratified sampling covered large
and small districts in every state of the country. Of the 250
questionnaires mailed, 156 were completed and returned. This
data permitted analysis of 131 different judicial districts representing all fifty states. Notably, all districts reported that jurors
received some kind of orientation training. Table 3 shows which
of five kinds of training-letters, oral remarks, handbooks, film,
instructions-are most frequently given.
TABLE 3
Types of Juror Orientation Training and Percentage of Use
Number of
Districts

Per Cent of
Total

Orientation Letter
Oral Remarks (Judge)
Juror's Handbook
Film
Jury Instructions

The following is a brief discussion of four commonly used
orientation tools:73
a. Letters. Although many jurors receive a personal letter
notifying them of their call to jury duty, only 3 percent of such
71. THE STATETRIAL
JUDGES'
BOOK,supra note 14, a t 98-99. See also Helwig, The
96, 99 (1971);
American Jury System: A Time For Reexamination, 55 JUDICATURE
O'Connor, The Right to Trial by a n Ignorant Jury, 3 TRIALJUDGES'
J . 3, 6 (1964); Those
Erroneous Images, Salt Lake Tribune, March 16, 1975, !j A, a t 16, col. 1.
72. This project was funded by the Drake.University Research Council (1974).
73. Discussion of the fifth type of orientation training covered by the Pre-Service
Juror Orientation Project survey, jury instructions, has been omitted because of the extensive discussion of this topic elsewhere in the article.
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letters serve an orientation function. Some of the reported orientation letters are too vague to be classified as meaningful training.
b. Oral orientation. The large majority of judges present
some pre-service message to jurors which they call training. The
length (see Table 4) and quality of these messages vary considerably.
TABLE 4
Length and Percentage of Total Judges' Oral Presentation:
Orientation Training of Jurors
Time in
Minutes

Number of
Districts

Per Cent of
Total

131

100.0

5 or less
15
30
45
60
75

Total

In analyzing the quality of sample oral presentations, the
Pre-Service Juror Orientation Project found that much of the
time is spent presenting three kinds of information:
(1) The historical background of the jury system and its
purpose, often beginning with the thirteenth century and proceeding to the present.
(2) Patriotic messages about the duty of all eligible citizens
to serve their country, delivered as persuasive appeals to keep
jurors from asking to be excused from jury service.
(3) Information regarding administrative matters, such as
fees, telephoning, and parking, eating, and restroom facilities.
Those who believe that the above kinds of information constitute true orientation are self-deceived. In fact, the main purpose such remarks serve is the social function of welcoming the
jurors. Such remarks are also intended to serve a persuasive function in that they attempt to deter as many jurors as possible from
asking to be excused from jury duty. In practice, very little of
such initial oral orientation provides meaningful information
which will help jurors to better understand the various stages of
a trial, legal terminology, or jury room deliberation procedure^.^^
74. Interviews and discussions conducted by the author at the National College of the
State Judiciary, Reno, Nevada, July 28-Aug. 2, 1974, at the Kansas Pattern Jury Instruc-
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A judge could spend his oral orientation time more
meaningfully by assigning a jury commissioner the responsibility
of announcing and explaining administrative details, as well as
giving information about the importance of jury service and how
jurors are called for duty. If patriotic and historical messages are
kept brief, a judge could spend much more of his time helping
jurors become acquainted with their role and trial procedures.
Another simple means of improving oral orientation sessions
would be to extend them to include the giving of certain instructions which would apply to any case, such as the meaning of
evidence, burden of proof, and the function of the jury.75
c. Handbooks. Both the National Conference of Rural Justice and the American Bar Association's Project on Standards for
Criminal Justice take the position that juror orientation is desirable and that tightly drawn juror handbooks are preferred to extemporaneous oral instruction^.^^ Perhaps reflective of this position is the fact that almost two-thirds of all judicial districts use
a juror's handbook in their training procedures (see Table 3).
These booklets vary considerably as to content, but the majority
cover a t least the following subjects: the importance of jury service, the jury panel selection process, the history of the jury
system, the types of cases (civil and criminal), the stages of a
trial, and expected jury behavior. Many manuals also include a
juror's creed or oath, definitions of some legal terms, and general
information about juror compensation.
But handbooks, to be of any value, must be read by jurors,
and some doubt exists as to the extent to which handbooks are
in fact studied. The author found as part of a survey that less
than 10 percent of the jurors had read any portion of the juror's
manual after one week of service.77However, evidence exists
which indicates that if handbooks are mailed to jurors prior to
service, and if jurors are strongly encouraged by letter to read the
manuals, the percentage of handbooks read increases to 75 percent or more.78
d . Films. As Table 3, above, illustrates, orientation films
tions Committee Meeting, Oct. 14-15, 1974, and at the American Academy of Judicial
(1972), supra note
Education Conference, Des Moines, Iowa, Dec. 4-6, 1974; WOLESLAGEL
34, at 48.
75. See O'Reilly, supra note 10, at 69.
76. ABA, STANDARDS
RELATING
TO THE ADMINISTRATION
OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
327 (1974);
Standards Relating to Trial by Jury (ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal
Justice) 86 (1968); Woleslagel (1974), supra note 10.
77. Forston (1973), supra note 10, at 69.
78. See Woleslagel (1974), supra note 10.
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are one of the least frequently utilized orientation tools. The PreService Orientation Project found that less than 7 percent of all
judicial districts utilize training films.
The content of the four films used by the responding districts
vary in their specificity and in their attempts to illuminate the
complex trial process and abstract legal language. The quality of
films available is called into question by the fact that almost 20
percent of the trial judges who responded to the questionnaire
volunteered, without the use of prompting questions, that they
were dissatisfied with existing training films. In general, the
judges complained that the films were either outdated or far too
general. Since the above information was volunteered and not
specifically requested, general dissatisfaction with existing training films is probably far more substantial than might be indicated by the 20 percent of respondents who mentioned this problem.
3. Improving juror orientation

The issue today is not whether to provide juror orientation-providing such training is universally recognized as being
desirable. The crucial issue is what quality of orientation should
be provided. At present, the quality of orientation training provided nationally is generally not high and should be improved.
The following are two suggested ways by which significant improvements in orientation quality might be obtained.
First, there is a need to coordinate the various training procedures into a single orientation program designed to help jurors
better understand and perform their function. One innovative
way to accomplish this would be to produce an orientation film
designed to be used in conjunction with a thorough, but readable,
juror handbook. Such a film should contain excerpts from trials
designed to show the jurors what to expect during the trial. The
handbook should teach the jurors about trial procedure, stages of
the trial, legal vocabulary, and other confusing items that they
will surely encounter. Both the handbook and the film could be
tested to determine the extent to which they successfully instruct
laymen in general trial procedure and legal concepts. The handbook, along with an orientation letter, should be mailed ten days
to two weeks in advance of the day a juror first reports for duty
in order to encourage prior study of the book. Additionally, the
judge, in his pre-service oral remarks, should stress the importance of becoming familiar with the material in the book.
Another training method which might prove to be worth developing for jurors who must spend long periods waiting, would
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be a series of compact listening comprehension training sessions.
These materials can be specifically designed to improve the jurors' ability to listen and understand information presented in
trial settings. A program of this type could consist of a series of
brief cassette tapes played to the jury when time permits. A pilot
study which the author conducted indicated the potential such a
program promises for improving juror comprehension. In that
study, a short listening comprehension course (with no special
emphasis on legal materials) improved the comprehension of jury
instructions by 15 percent .7g
If courts will be innovative enough to implement practices
such as those suggested, they will soon find they have jurors with
a much better understanding of the legal process and who are
better able to intelligently perform their function.

D. Two- Way Communication
1.

The problem of "linear-one- way " communication

Empirical study has revealed a fourth area of weakness in the
jury system-a failure to achieve two-way communication. Much
of the confusion in the jury room results from the fact that jurors
are not allowed to ask clarifying questions, either as to matters
of evidence or as to points of law. And, as the studies have further
indicated, once the jurors are in the deliberating room they are
extremely reluctant to send a question to the judge. The result is
that the jurors make their decision without having their questions
answered-without having all the information they feel is important.80
Acknowledging the validity of these findings, it is clear that
jury trials, as traditionally conducted, are classic examples of a
"linear-one-way" communication process. The linear-one-way
communication process occurs when person A transmits a message to person B without allowing B to respond to A. A wealth of
empirical, theoretical, and practical evidence shows that in such
communicative situations messages invariably become distorted? Distortion occurs principally through leveling, sharpen79. Forston (1973), supra note 10, at 69.
80. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
81. See, e.g., G.ALLPORT
& L. POSTMAN,
THEPSYCHOLOGY
OF RUMOR
(1947); D. BARNLUND, INTERPERSONAL
COMMUNICATION:
SURVEY
AND STUDIES
229 (1968); F. BARTLEIT,
REMEMBERING(1932); D. BERLO,
THE PROCESS
OF COMMUNICATION
111 (1960); J. KELTNER,
INTERPERSONAL
SPEECH-COMMUNICATION
84 (1970); K. SERENO
& C. MORTENSEN,
FOUNDATIONS OF COMMUNICATION
THEORY
(1970); Carmichael, Hogan & Walter, An Experimental
Study of the Effect of Language on the Reproduction of Visually Perceived Form, 15 J .
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ing, assimilation, and secondarily, through exaggeration, condensation, and conventi~nalization.~
As messages become longer and
more complex under one-way communication, the communication is received less accurately and with more frustration and
hostility.
Two-way communication or circular response, on the other
hand, incorporates the crucially important component of "feedback."% Feedback encourages the sender to rectify unclear messages and to supply missing information without which the communication may be incomplete or confusing. Experiments have
demonstrated with consistency that the accuracy of information
transferred by two-way communication far exceeds the accuracy
of information passed by one-way communication. Moreover,
two-way communication increases both sender and receiver confidence, generates less frustration, and promotes more willingness
to decide and act on the basis of i n f o r m a t i ~ n . ~ ~
The findings of two-way communication research have important implications for traditional jury trial procedures. One
expert, who has done research in this area, discusses three implications:
1. However clear a witness or lawyer may be in his own
mind about the information he seeks to communicate to the
jury, it follows from the very nature of one-way communication
that except in the case of very simple messages the information
as received is bound to be distorted;
2. Gaps or omissions in the evidence, even though highly
relevant to a proper determination of the issues, cannot be remedied under conditions of one-way communication; and
3. The jury's seeming lack of power to seek corrective or
EXP.PSYCH.
73 (1932); Gibson, The Reproduction of Visually Perceived Forms, 12 J. EXP.
PSYCH.1 (1929); Leavitt & Mueller, Some Effects of Feedback on Communication, 4
HUMAN
RELATIONS
401 (1951); Powers, Clark & McFarland, A General Feedback Theory
AND MOTOR
SKILLS71 (1960); Stolz & Tannenbaum,
of Human Behavior, 11 PERCEP~UAL
218 (1963); Tustin,
Effects of Feedback on Oral Encoding Behavior, 6 LANG.AND SPEECH
Feedback, 187 SCI.AM. 48 (1952).
82. Leveling is a process of systematically omitting details of the communication
which do not conform to the stereotypes about the persons sending the message.
Sharpening stresses the details that remain in the familiar pattern, and is partly a result
of the leveling process; since fewer details remain, those left are more prominent.
Assimilation adapts the message to the most available frames of reference. Condensation
reduces the message to a few easily remembered details. Conventionalization removes
unfamiliar elements from the message, such as strange words, subtle shadings of meaning,
and so on.
83. See Haney, A Comparative Study of Unilateral and Bilateral Communication, 7
ACA.OF MANAGEMENT
J. 128 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Haney].
84. Edises, supra note 14, a t 78; Haney, supra note 83, a t 132.
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supplementary information encourages speculation about matters which are without adequate factual basis or otherwise inappropriate for jury consideration. Questioning by the jurors during the course of the trial would tend to pinpoint such areas of
improper speculation and enable the trial judge to neutralize
the effects by appropriate a d m ~ n i t i o n . ~ ~

Thus, if the function of the jury is truly a fact-finding one, the
jury should have the right to question witnesses, attorneys, and
the judge regarding issues in the case. Similarly, if the jury is
expected to apply the law with any degree of intelligence, it
should have the right to ask questions of the judge to ascertain
the meaning of the law it is trying to apply. Only through such
two-way communication can this essential information be accurately transferred from the trial participants to the jurors.
2. Appropriateness of two-way communication in jury trials

While some courts do encourage questioning by jurors,86more
frequently courts criticize the practice." One objection raised in
opposition to allowing questions by jurors is that two-way communication will lengthen trials and thus further retard the functioning of our overburdened trial courts. While it is true that twoway communication tends to take more time, the additional time
typically should be minimal. If the questioning takes more time,
it may well be the result of a complex or poorly presented case.
On the other hand, clarifications of proof, and the consequent
enlightenment of the jurors resulting from feedback, will probably shorten the deliberation period. As discussed previously,
much needless deliberation time is caused by the confusion and
ambiguity inherent in one-way communication.88Accordingly,
the result of allowing juror questions might in fact prove to be
shorter and more accurate, rather than longer, trials.
The primary reservation about permitting juror questions,
however, is that such questions might interfere with the orderly
conduct of the trial. This concern is an important criticism and
is regarded as valid by both friend and foe of the practice. The
problem is that since jurors are not trained in the law, there is a
great likelihood that they will ask improper questions. This prob-

85. Edises, supra note 14. See also Hacker, supra note 14.
86. Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 872,878 and cases cited at 879 (1970). It is interesting to note
that in English courts jurors are permitted to ask questions throughout the course of the
trial. See Hacker, supra note 14, at 55. Moreover, coroner's juries in the United States
are allowed to pose questions. See Edises, supra note 14, a t 79.
87. Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 872, 880 and cases cited at 881 (1970).
88. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
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lem is compounded by the fact that attorneys are reluctant to
object to questions by jurors for fear of prejudicing the jury
against their case.
These potential problems need not necessarily create chaos.
Modifications of the rules can be devised which will enable jurors
to pose their questions in an orderly manner. An example of such
possible modification is incorporated in the following recommendation :
The jurors can be told at the commencement of the trial that
they have the right to propound questions to each witness just
before his dismissal from the stand. The requirement that questions be in writing and handed to the judge will tend to avoid
possible indiscretions by the questioning juror. The judge can
rule on the propriety of the questions and, if necessary, rephrase
them to meet evidentiary requirements. Objections by counsel
can be dealt with privately by summoning the attorneys to the
bench or to chambers, thus preventing an objecting lawyer from
being put 'on the spot' with the juror who proposed the question.
Requests to counsel for clarification or amplification of evidence
can likewise be screened for appropriateness by the trial judge.89

Judge Robert Jones of Portland, Oregon, reports that for
more than fifteen years he has followed procedures similar to
those outlined above. He indicates that jurors' questions serve a
valuable function as immediate feedback to the lawyers and to
himself, as the judge, regarding how clearly the case is being
presented?O Similarly, Judge Frederick Woleslagel of Lyons,
Kansas, occasionally invites the trial attorneys to present pertinent juror questions and follow-up questions to the appropriate
witnes~es.~'
In light of communication theory and research, it
seems clear that other courts should follow the lead of judges such
as these.

E. Note-Taking
1. The problem of recall
A fifth means of lessening juror confusion is to allow jurors
to take notes during the delivery of trial testimony. Note-taking
has much to offer as a means of improving communication, for
only through some type of written record can a juror be expected
89. Edises, supra note 14, at 79.
90. R. Jones, "Judge-Jury Relations" Course at the National College of the State
Judiciary, Reno, Nevada (June 23-July 5, 1974).
91. Woleslagel (1974), supra note 10.
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to remember in any detail all the testimony presented in the
course of a lengthy or complex case.g2One commentator described
the situation this way:
Jurors are not allowed to take notes. This rule prevails no
matter how long the trial, or complicated the testimony, or ambiguous the law. Our case was relatively short, but it still added
up to forty hours of unrelieved listening, the equivalent of a
semester's worth of lectures. Imagine not taking a single note
during a college course and then being expected to do justice to
a final exam.93

2. Appropriateness of note-taking to jury trials

Despite the existence of the above described situation,
numerous objections have been raised against allowing notetaking by jurors. Some argue it would give undue advantage to
the literate over the illiterate, or to the person who takes copious
notes over the person who doodles. The answer to that objection
is that the present system gives advantage to the person who
purports to have the better memory, or who has the more domineering personality-under no system would all jurors have equal
influence. Other critics argue that jurors would miss parts of the
testimony while involved in the act of writing; but this seems less
serious than the danger that a juror will simply forget even
greater amounts of testimony under the present practice because
he is not allowed to make a written reminder for himself.
Some safeguards on note-taking are of course desirable because there concededly are dangers involved. Judge Elvin J.
Brown of Norman, Oklahoma, suggests three worthwhile precautions which should be observed:
First, all jurors should have equal opportunity although
none should be required to take notes against their will. The
trial judge should be prepared to distribute pencil and pad to
each juror to guarantee equality of opportunity, even though
some may only use them on which to doodle.
Second, jurors should be assured of the confidentiality of
their notes. The subject matter of their notes should only be
92. An historical survey of juror note taking and a detailed discussion of the arguments pro and con are beyond the scope of this paper. For a general discussion of this
topic, see Buzard, Jury Note-Taking in Criminal Trials, 42 J. CRIM.L.C. & P.S. 490
(1951); Petroff, The Practice of Jury Note Taking-Misconduct, Right or Privilege?, 18
OKLA.L. REV.125 (1965); Comment, More About Jurors and Note Taking, 103 BARBULL.
OF BOSTON
6 (1935); 11 S. CAR.L.Q.397 (1959); 34 TEX.
L.REV. 1100 (1956); Note, The
Roblem of Note-Taking by Jurors, 18 U. Prrr. L. REV.800 (1957).
93. Hacker, supra note 14, at 55.
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revealed in the privacy of the deliberations of the jury, and only
then when the juror with notes elects to disclose them.
Third, the jurors should be admonished to be as tolerant of
the notes of another as they should be of another's independent
recollection of the proceedings. After all, there's no magic in
note taking. The percentage of reversible error in cases tried by
a judge will probably run about the same for the cases in which
he takes notes as those in which he doesn't.v4

While the vast majority of federal and state jurisdictions
allow trial judges to permit jurors to take notes, few judges have
If jurors are expected to remember and
exercised this dis~retion?~
consider all the relevant facts in deliberation, steps should be
taken to reverse this situation.

F. Juror Selection
The final suggestion for improving the jury system lies in the
area of juror selection. Ordinarily the criteria by which certain
jurors are selected and others are excluded from service are not
regarded as part of the communication process. However, the
personal abilities and qualifications that a listener brings to a
communication process have a great influence on the quality of
the communication. This phenomenon was illustrated by the fact
that the well-educated jurors in one study described above scored
much higher on the jury instruction comprehension tests than did
l e may be contended that
the broader sample of j u r ~ r s . ~ V h i it
the college student jurors were simply better at taking tests, an
equally valid inference is that well-educated jurors understand
legal concepts better and are able to apply them more intelligently.
1. The problem of juror selection
a. Exemption from jury service. Two prime factors affect
the demographic characteristics of citizens who serve on juries.
The first is exemption from jury service. Over the years jury trials
have become increasingly longer. Also, jury terms are fairly long,
averaging between two and four weeks, with some rural areas
requiring jurors to be on call for three months or longer. Due to
the time commitment involved, the vast majority of citizens
94. Brown,Note Taking by Jurors, 10 JUDGES' J . 27 (1971).
95. Id.
96. See Table 2, supra. See also Broeder, Occupational Expertise and Bias as Affecting Juror Behavior: A Preliminary Look, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV.1079 (1965);James, supra note
3, at 565.
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initially contacted for jury service ask to be excused for personal
or work hardships, and most of these requests are honored. Those
excused include large numbers of managerial, executive, and professional people, and those with higher incomes and college education~.~'
Moreover, each state has an exemption statute which
officially excuses dozens of occupational c a t e g o r i e ~ Hence,
.~~
the
elderly, unemployed, and mature housewives with grown children
dominate the basic jury pool.
b. Exclusion by voir dire. The second factor with affects
jury make-up is the selection process exercised during the voir
dire examination. One study found that voir dire screening eliminates a large proportion of the following classes of jurors: Roman
Catholics; managerial, executive, and professional people; persons in the highest paid and the most prestigious job categories;
and those with college degrees.9gThus, legal rules, instead of
being shaped to ameliorate the effects of the jury's weaknesses,
seem to have been almost purposefully designed to augment
them.loOAs described above, the typical jury selection process
provides an excellent example of the steps the law has taken to
impede the jury's successful performance of its fact-finding function. As one critic has said:
The body of law governing the selection of jurors, rather
than recognizing and attempting to reduce the affects of the
juror's inexperience in handling legal matters, has instead exempted from service many of the groups who might best be
expected to overcome this handicap.lol

We must be certain that those who find facts as jurors have
the capacity to think, to understand problems, and to apply the
law. Systematic exemption of those citizens who may have the
97. See Douty, How People Stay Off Juries, POTOMAC,
Jan. 28, 1968, a t 20-22, 26-27.
98. The Illinois exemption statute is thypical:
The following persons shall be exempt from serving as jurors, to-wit: The
Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, State Comptroller, Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Attorney General, members of the
General Assembly during their term of office, all judges of courts, all clerks of
courts, sheriffs, coroners, practicing physicians, Christian Science practitioners,
Christian Science readers, postmasters, practicing attorneys, all officers of the
United States, officiating ministers of the gospel, members of religious communities, mayors of cities, policemen, active members of the Fire Department
and all persons actively employed upon the editorial or mechanical staffs and
departments of any newspaper of general circulation printed and published in
this state.
REV. STAT.ch. 78, 0 4 (Supp. 1973).
99. Padawer-Singer, supra note 12, at 388.
100. Broeder, The Function of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. CHI. L. REV.386,
:1954) [hereinafter cited as Broeder].
101. Id.
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best credentials is disgraceful and perhaps an unconstitutional
denial of the right to trial by a jury of one's peers.lo2
2. Improving the juror selection process

a. Encouraging service. Procedures could easily be developed to help make the jury pool a more accurate cross-section of
the community. The basic philosophy that needs to be followed
is that of doing as much as is reasonably feasible to facilitate a
juror's performance of his duty. Economic conditions and other
annoying frustrations must not be allowed to keep citizens from
being willing to serve.
Shorter required jury terms are a prerequisite of implementing such a philosophy. A short two-week term would encourage
service by many who now ask to be excused. In the same vein,
too many judges and jury commissioners make jury service an
either-or proposition: either you serve now or you are excused.
Other viable options exist. For example, a prospective juror could
have his service postponed to a more convenient time. Or a list
of dates might be made available from which a citizen could
select the most convenient time for him to serve. In the case of
special hardships, where even two weeks may be too long, a juror
might be asked to serve on one case, or for a few days, or for one
week, and then be excused for the remainder of the term.
A second means of lessening the unfavorable impact of jury
service would be to provide jurors with better facilities during
their waiting periods. If businessmen and professionals had access to a telephone, typewriter, table, and dictating equipment,
much of the hardship arising from jury service would be reduced.
Some cities furnish jurors with free street parking or free parking
in municipal lots. Thoughtfulness toward those who must serve
certainly encourages jury service from more individuals and reduces requests for early release from duty.
Another reform which is needed is the payment of juror fees
which are more commensurate with the financial sacrifices incurred by jurors. A higher fee structure is essential in order to
obtain a more accurate cross-section of the community on jury
panels. lo3
b. The voir dire screening process. The fact that capable
102. See C. JOINER,
CIVIL
JUSTICE
AND THE JURY
78 (1962); Winick, The Psychology of
AND CRIMINAL
PSYCH.
96 (H. Toch ed. 1961).
Juries, LEGAL
103. ABA, STANDARDS
RELATING
TO THE ADMINISTRATION
OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
327
(1974); Standards Relating to Trial by Jury (ABA Project on Minimum Standards for
Criminal Justice) 89 (1968).
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jurors are screened out during voir dire examination is not as
easily corrected. It will be necessary for trial attorneys and judges
to recognize and deal with the inconsistency of criticising the jury
for its inability to understand and evaluate facts and the law,
while a t the same time dismissing those potential jurors who are
the most qualified.
I t has been said that the least informed jurors are often
sought by those whose cases are weak and who wish to pull the
wool over uninformed eyedo4It has also been argued that the
most capable jurors are likely to have too much influence with
other jurors and, therefore, should be challenged. lo5 But as mentioned above, influence is relative; every jury has those who are
most influential. Nothing can insure a group of jurors with equal
influence among themselves.106If an attorney and his client are
seeking a fair jury, they will probably desire that the most, rather
than the least, informed individuals participate as jurors.lo7
A case for judge-conducted voir dire may be made based on
the hypothesis that it would, to some limited extent, reduce the
screening out of the more qualified citizens as jurors. Even if such
a change were made, however, lawyers could still affect the composition of a jury through their use of peremptory challenges. The
propriety of using peremptory challenges for the purpose of excusing those who are most experienced is a t least questionable, if not
unethical, and some believe these challenges should be abolished.lo8 Some reformers have recommended use of special or
"blue ribbon" juries in order to obtain more jurors from upper
socio-economic backgrounds than normally serve. log The "blue
ribbon" method of selecting jurors was employed in federal jury
trials until the latter part of the 1960's but is no longer permitted
because of racial inequities.l1°Although such "blue ribbon" selection techniques may not be allowed, the legal profession should
not allow the jury selection process to be so distorted as to, in
effect, prohibit our most capable citizens from contributing their
abilities to the justice system.
104. WOLESLAGEL
(1972), supra note 34, at 58-60.
105. Broeder, supra note 100, at 391.
106. J. FRANK,
COURTS
ON TRIAL
188 (1949).
107. Forston (1968), supra note 7, at 81; Blade, Professor: Juries Often Decide Early,
Minneapolis Star, July 29, 1967, § A at 9.
108. Broeder, supra note 100 at 391.
109. See, e.g., Baker, In Defense of the "Blue RibbonJ'Jury, 35 IOWA
L. REV.409
(1950).
110. WOLESLAGEL
(1972), supra note 34, at 25.
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This article has attempted to demonstrate that problems of
communication are present in the jury system and are severely
impairing the functioning of jurors. In addition, certain possible
solutions to those problems were suggested. Yet, while this review
of communication problems and possible solutions may encourage some judges to experiment with the ideas presented, others
will demand more conclusive empirical evidence on the effects
that the proposed communication procedures will have on jury
deliberations and final verdicts. Such requests are valid; unfortunately, little data has been assembled. Therefore, perhaps the
most important function this article can serve is to help the legal
profession recognize that the issues discussed herein are vital
enough to warrant major attention by researchers and funding
agencies.
Even though problems are present in the jury system, they
can be largely resolved by changing the conditions under which
jurors must labor. These changes will occur if trial courts are
willing to try new ideas, if appellate courts are willing to support
trial courts in their controlled experiments with new communication processes, and if funding is made available to support the
proper administrative management of the changes and to empirically evaluate their effects.

